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2The Law and Economics of Environmental Taxation:
When Should the Ecotax Kick in?
Ecological taxes are categorically different from the classical taxes which seek to extract a
certain revenue at a minimum excess burden. Classical taxes are levied so as to interfere with
the market based allocation of recourses as little as possible. Ecological taxes, on the other
hand, are designed to achieve a well defined ecological effect again at a minimum of excess
burdens. The revenue of an ecological tax, however, is coincidental and nil when the tax is
ecologically optimal. Most ecological taxes currently proposed are not ecologically optimal as
defined here. In generating revenues they partly miss the ecological objective. The tax 
revenue is an indication that the ecologically relevant decisions of some agents in the jurisdicti-
on have not been affected so as to achieve the desired ecological result. 
This paper explores the law and economics of ecological taxation from this point of view. The
question is: how can an optimal ecological tax be institutionally structured so as to have a
maximum impact on ecologically relevant decisions in the desired scope and direction? The
paper systematically explores and applies James M. Buchanan's Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in
Economic Theory (Chicago: Markham, 1969) to this question and derives an innovative
institutional solution.
Key words: choice influencing taxes, ecological taxation, environmental taxation, opportunity
cost, global warming, carbon fuel consumption, regulatory decisions under uncertainty. 
J.E.L. codes: H21, K34, Q28, 38
Parts II-IV can be read after skipping part I.2
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The Law and Economics of Environmental Taxation: When Should the
Ecotax Kick In?
In this essay, it is being argued that environmental taxes are fundamentally different from
traditional taxes. They are not primarily designed to be revenue raising instruments, nor are
they regulatory taxes in the sense of accomplishing slight changes in individual or firm behavi-
our. The point of environmental taxation and of designing an environmentally sound tax system
is rather to accomplish deep and structural changes in the economic and ecological behaviour
of individuals, households and firms, i.e. changes of patterns and not changes of degree. When
these basic patterns of behaviour and processes are to be influenced, it is important to identify
those basic aspects that are environmentally and ecologically important and susceptible to
change as a consequence of a tax intervention. Consequently, one has to identify those instan-
ces where basic choices can be taken and where decision makers face alternatives among which
they can choose. 
This approach is different from the standard approach to discussing environmental taxation.
The law and economics approach pursued in this essay looks at structural changes and the
possibility of effecting such changes through tax instruments. The standard approach to
ecological taxation is to impose regulatory taxations so as to curtail environmentally and
ecologically undesirable effects and thereby even generate a double dividend consisting of on
the one hand the improvement of the environment and the ecological system and on the other
hand a revenue which can be used for different policy ends, such as those relating to the
environment and the ecological system. Taxes which promise to generate such a double
dividend are, of course, politically very attractive. It has, however, repeatedly been pointed out
that the double dividend approach is basically flawed (Backhaus (1995), Schneider and Volkert
(1996) ). After initial enthusiasm on the part of politicians and policy advisors, the consensus
has now vanished and it has even been suggested that the double dividend be negative. (Boven-
berg and de Mooij, 1994)
With so much ambiguity surrounding one of the core concepts of environmental taxation, a
fresh approach may well be tried. This essay first looks at central features of the double
dividend approach from a law and economics point of view. It then explores a Coasian per-
spective in order then to proceed to an analysis based on a rigorous application of Buchanan’s
cost and choice oncept. A fourth section contains a simple illustration. The essay concludes
with a summary and an emphasis on unresolved issues.2
I. The Double Dividend
The case for the double dividend in specific forms of environmental taxation has for instance
been made by Pearce, 1991, with an application to carbon taxes. Although many different
formulations are possible, and the double dividend can be derived in different ways, the stand-
ard approach relies on a scenario where in a particular fiscal entity tax rates are high and
Frederick Seitz, “A Major Deception on <Global Warming'”, Wall Street Journal3
Europe, June 20, 1996 and “Letters to the Editor”: “Cover-up in the Greenhouse?”,
August 6, 1996.
Quoted after Bohm, 1996, p. 4. The original quote is L. Goulder, “Environmental4
Taxation and the “Double Dividend”. A Reader’s Guide”. Paper presented at the
International Institute of Public Finance, 50th congress, Cambridge, Massachussets,
August 23-25, 1994, also in NBER working paper, nr. 4896.
4
allocative distortions are substantial to the point that governments feel an urge to reduce the
excess burden without reducing public spending. If in such a scenario a tax can be levied on an
environmentally damaging input such as carbon fuel, the demand for which is highly in- elastic,
the excess burden of that carbon tax will be low, and the revenue can be used in order to
substitute for the revenue derived from those taxes which can only be imposed with a high
excess burden. The double dividend then appears on the one hand in addressing an environ-
mental problem (an externality), in generating a substantial revenue at low cost to the economy
and in consequently reducing excess burdens from taxes that meet high levels of resistence. 
In order to understand the context in which the notion of the double dividend became promi-
nent and from which policy advise has often been extracted without properly noting this
context, let us quote from Pearce, (1991:938) “who sets out those conditions. These are: 
a: That if warming occurs it will impose significant damage;
b: That the damage is irreversible;
c: That the initial cost of controlling greenhouse gas emissions are low;
d: That greenhouse gas controls bring incidental or joint benefits besides the containment of 
global warming.”
The incidental benefits warrant closer mention. “The two basic technological responses are 
a. substitution of low carbon fuels for high carbon fuels (for instance natural gas for coal,
nuclear energy, or both) and 
b. energy conservation in the sense of reductions in the ratio of carbon based energy to econo-
mic activity. Both technological responses have the effect of reducing “conventional” air
pollutants, such as nitrogine oxydes, sulfor oxydes and suspendent particulates (dust and
smoke).” (Pearce, 1991:939). The context of the debate is then adequately described like this:
“This combination of uncertainty, irreversibility, probable initial low control costs, possible
very high damage costs in the absence of action, and potentially high joint benefits from
control, suggest that the policy stance on global warming should be fairly aggressive”. (Pearce,
1991:939). 
To understand the astonishing degree of disagreement among economists and policy makers
with respect to global warming that has recently erupted one shoul  appreciate the particular3
framing of the debate. Goulder (1994) remarks in his “Reader’s Guide”: “thus the debate about
the double dividend reflects the desire to be able to make safe judgements about environmental
reforms in the presence of uncertainty”. The situation is reminiscent of the strategy used by4
Kaldor and Hicks when they were looking for a normative anchor on which to hang their
modern approach to welfare economics. When looking at a particular policy proposition, the
5Pareto principle should be invoked as if it were unknown who the beneficiaries of that policy
would be and who would be harmed. It should be sufficient to satisfy the compensation
possibility criterion, i.e. the total benefits summed over all individuals should outweigh the
total costs summed over all individuals, so that in principle, the former could compensate the
latter. The reason for this approach, which denies the existence of well established property
rights and legitimate expectations on which investment decisions are being based, was the
notion that in the long run and with a consistent application of this principle, the distribution of
costs and benefits would be uncertain and hence likely an even one so as to provide for a net
benefit to all, not of any particular policy measure, but of the adoption of the policy rule. 
II. A Coasian View
Against this reasoning, which, in fact, underpins the entire edifice of modern welfare econo-
mics, Ronald Coase has consistently argued with respect to the special case of externalities that
such externalities merely reflect the existence of incompatible uses of the same resources by
different agents. In the presence of well established property rights, and in the absence of
significant transactions costs, externalities cannot persist since the right of use will be appropri-
ated by that actor with the highest willingness to pay or, alternatively speaking, he who expe-
riences the highest cost from an externality will seek to contain those costs by either establis-
hing his property rights over the entire range of resource uses or else by trying to recover as
large a compensation as possible from the sale of his rights of usage. 
By way of example, consider a coal based electricity generation plant located in a valley close
to a river from which it can take cold water for its cooling tower, which it partly re-emits into
the river and partly into the air. Assume further that, next to the warming effect, there is no
further contamination of the water which is being re-introduced into the local ecological
system. In addition, electricity generation by burning coal leads to partly toxic fumes which can
be reduced to safe levels by building large smoke stacks and thereby distributing the substance
over a large area. The local economy in the ecological system is further assumed to consist of
agriculture based production, for the sake of simplicity we assume wine growing on the slopes
of the mountain surrounding the river and fishery in the river. 
From a physical point of view, there is emittance of fumes into the air, which can be spread
over a large area so as to avoid safety problems: there will be a warming of the water and a
certain amount of (clean) steam being released into the air. Both a combination of a warmer
river and steam in the air are likely to lead to the formation of mist which inhibits sun exposure
of the grapes.
From the point of view of the fishery industry, the warming of the river will affect the existing
supply of fish. Finally, if additional sources of toxic smoke are located outside our ecological
system in question with similar techniques of dispersion, the operation of the carbon based
power plant within the system may well lead to unsafe levels of toxic exposure, in the sense
that ceasing the operation of the plant would reduce the levels of toxic exposure again to safe
levels. 
On the basis of these assumptions let us look at the externalities in question from a Coasian
See Jürgen Backhaus, "Subsidiarity and Ecologically Based Taxation: Aspirations and5
Options", in: Sabine Urban (ed.), Europe in Progress, Wiesbaden: Gabler, 1995, pp.
223-264.
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point of view. The intra-system externalities crucially depend on the number of different uses
we allow to be made of the eco-system. We have incompatibilities between the power plant
and the wine growing industry, between the power plant and the fishing industry, but no
incompatibility between wine growing and fishing - small wonder, since both have probably co-
existed for a long period of time with well established property rights governing the use of the
river and the surrounding mountain slopes. The negative effects from warming of the river can
probably be contained on the part of the fishing industry if there is certainty about the tempera-
ture of the water and fish used to higher temperatures can be bread and harvested in that
segment of the river. That would, however, imply that the inflow of colder water will now have
to be regarded as a negative externality from the point of view of using the river for warmer
water fish. Hence, any arrangement as between the fishing industry and the power plant would
have to involve garantees and compensation schemes with respect to the temperature of the
river. Both the right to bread and harvest fish and the right to emit warm water would have to
be curtailed so as to make the two uses of the river compatible. Fishermen would not be
allowed to bread and harvest those species of fish that are particularly vulnerable to large
fluctuations of water temperature, and in particular vulnerable to excessively low levels of
water temperature, because that is most difficult for the power plant to control during the
spring season when the ice is melting in the mountains. With respect to these two parties, then,
a partitioning of the traditional rights of uses would allow trade and contractual 
arrangements governing this trade. 
With respect to the relationship between the power plant and the wine growing industry, the
formation of mist is crucial, which implies that under those weather conditions when mist is
crucial (in particular during the early Fall when sun exposure is necessary for the grapes to
ripen and mist can lead to the contamination with insects and diseases) the two uses of wine
growing and cooling with river water have to be reconciled. Hence, a contractual arrangement
needs to be designed that governs the ejection of steam during these sensitive periods: alterna-
tive forms of cooling or additional forms of re-cooling the steam before re-emanating it into
the river or ejecting it into the air may have to be considered, the timing of ejection or emanati-
on may also be crucial during the day, as for instance late afternoon mist formation on sunny
days in unlikely. Again, a partitioning of property rights with respect to the water use including
the possibility of mist formation and with particular emphasis on that possibility during crucial
periods of growth and harvast will in all likelihood allow for the internalization of the externali-
ty through an effective definition of property rights. 
The analysis has, so far, been substantially facilitated by limiting the number of alternate and
partly incompatible uses of the common resource (the valley with the river) for the three
different purposes of energy generation, wine growing and fishing. In addition, the plant emits
toxic fumes, which, however, become toxic only if additional sources of emission exist outside
the system. Obviously, here a different ecological regime needs to be defined for that particular
resource use, which is independent from the other resource uses. It is here where the principle
of subsidiarity has to be invoked. In order to draw the conclusions from the Coasian analysis,5
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nation, book 5, chapter 2, part 2, section 2. London:6
Dent, 1971, II, p. 306.
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it is interesting to note which decisions need to be affected in order to allow compatible
resource use by means of an optimal partitioning of property rights. With respect to the power
plant, it is important to recognize the alternate uses in chosing appropriate technologies and
modes of operation. On the one hand, with respect to agriculture (wine growing), plant
operation needs to take into account weather conditions during particular periods of the year
with respect to providing for a containment of the emission of the cooling substance water into
both air and river. This may require a different definition of peak times with respect to produc-
tion, alternate uses of cooling equipment, larger cooling systems so as to have more standby
cooling power as well as close monitoring of weather conditions. These decisions, in all
likelihood, can be cost effectively taken at the time of plant construction and design. Later, it
will likely be more expensive to make alterations or take these conditions into account as
constraints on operation. This aspect of the scenario is consistent with the assumptions in the
global warming debate, which also contain the notion that an early intervention will lead to
lower total costs than a later one. 
With respect to the relationship between the power plant and the fishermen, again the manage-
ment of the emanation and emission of the cooling substance is crucial. Interestingly, here at
times a larger inflow of warm water into the river may be required in order to protect the
fishing stock from sudden drops in water temperature. As obviously the pattern of breeding
and harvesting fish can largely contain the cost of sudden temperature drops, during Winter
seasons different fish can populate the river than during Summer seasons, the requirement may
only involve relatively small peak periods and, in this case, require the emanation of uncooled
water into the river. Again, a large water reservoir and the ability of using and managing
different forms of cooling will be required for this approach to be successful. Very similar to
the first case, again the cost of operation will largely be affected by the timing of the decisions,
and when the decisions can be taken at the time of design and construction of the plant, the
costs will in all likelihood be much lower than if later alterations of plant design, process of
production or management need to be implemented. 
III.  Basing Environmental Taxation on Opportunity Costs
“The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time
of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to
the contributor, and to every other person.”When we deal with effective environmental6
taxation, every one aspect of this principle, which is part of the traditional canons of taxation,
stands to be violated. To see this, we have to invoke the difference between objective costs and
subjective or choice influencing costs, that has been effectively introduced into public finance
James M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory. C icago:7
Markham, 1969.
In mentioning Pigou’s name, I feel compelled to add that Pigou himself felt corrective8
taxes to be impossible, as the taxing authority would lack the requisite information.
See A.C. Pigou, Socialism vs. Capitalism, London: McMillan, 1947, pp. 40-44: “But
the practical difficulty of determining the right rates of bounty and of duty would be
extraordinarily great. The data necessary for scientific decision are almost whole
lacking”. (pp. 42/43).
8
analysis by James M. Buchanan. Pigou’s theory of regulatory taxation, which underlies the7 8
current literature on environmental taxation, is based on the notion that the external costs of a
particular activity can be internalized into the decision calculus by means of imposing a tax,
thereby reducing the externality. This requires, however, that the taxing authority is aware of
the costs. This in turn requires the notion that costs can be objectively measured. Costs that
can be objectively measured, on the other hand, need not be those that influence decisions. As
we have seen in the introductory survey, carbon taxes are supposed to meet an in-elastic
demand for carbon fuel, only in the long run leading to the substitution of more energy efficient
carbon fuels over less energy efficient ones. Speaking of an in-elastic demand subject to
taxation means that the tax does not influence the decisions of the taxee to any large degree. 
In order to appreciate the breadth of this statement, consider the example used before in the
following way. After the electric power plant has been installed and power supplies have been
improved for the region, the wine growers suddenly and unexpectedly experience heavy losses
due to the formation of mist in the valley. They intervene with the government which proceeds
to impose a power penny, i.e. a certain percentage charge on each currency unit billed. The “x”
percentage charge, called a power penny in order to emphasize its environmental appeal, is
calculated to equal the losses of the wine growers and implemented as an ecological regulatory
charge. No doubt, this power penny satisfies Smith’s criterion of a certain tax, and it can be
readily implemented, since the charge can just be added to the normal bill. Yet, the power
penny is unlikely to have any significant effect on the activity of the power plant that causes the
externality. Although the vintners may be compensated for the damages they suffer, the
economy as a whole still suffers the loss of either less wine production or wine of lower quality
or both, while energy will be more expensive for all. Hence, the bundle of products available to
consumers in the economy will be smaller with the same money income, the power penny only
spreads the externality, it does not internalize it. The power penny, in this sense, is no different
from the smoke stack. It just spreads the externality, like a financial equivalent to the physically
distributing chimney.
An environmentally and ecologically relevant tax needs to be a tax that affects the choice
influencing costs. In designing such a choice influencing environmental tax, we have to look
for the time and locus at which environmentally relevant choices are made. Since these choices
are not made on any basis of periodicity as a normal tax would require, an incentive needs to
be created which triggers the tax. This may sound paradoxical, since a tax is by definition an
involuntary payment that for this very reason tends not to be initiated by the entity to be taxed.
In the case of environmentally relevant taxes, however, the situation must be different. Neither
choice influencing costs, which are subjective, nor locus and time of decision making are
directly or indirectly observable by an outside agency, such as a tax authority. In our example,
9the appropriate decisions with respect to the design of the plant, the production process and
the management of production with a view to allowing different uses of the same resource can,
but need not be taken before production activity actually starts or when new investments are
due. 
The objective of the tax is to encourage environmentally and ecologically preferable plant
design, production processes and production management, but what this design, these proces-
ses and the management will be is only known to the decision takers involved, and only after
an appropriate decision making process has been launched. This implies that the tax involved
can only be of the type of an incentive. If that is the case, however, the question arises as to
what might consitute the tax base. 
As we noticed above, partitioning of property rights so as to make different resource use
compatible in fact moves the production possibility frontier in a north eastern direction. The
resulting production potential constitutes a source of earnings for the participants, which in
itself constitutes a tax base. When a tax authority tries to encourage the creation of a stream of 
income in order to broaden the tax base, it can grant deductions as an incentive. Such 
deductions then can form an appropriate lever to encourage environmentally or ecologically
desired changes, which cannot be prescribed but only be triggered by way of incentive. The
system then takes on the following form. When a particular project is to be added to an exis-
ting eco-system, as in our case the power plant, building and operation permits need to be
secured as usual. Similarly, financing will be dependent on these permits. Under the present
regime, no particular attempt at redefining property rights through multiple negotiations can be
expected. The transactions costs required to lead to an optimal repartitioning of property rights
in these cases can be assumed to be substantial. It is here where the ecological tax instrument
must provide a lever. 
An opportunity for re-negotiating a partitioning of property rights in order to make different
uses of the same resource compatible can be created by providing for a tax incentives on the
grounds of ecologically desired improvements. If a scheme such as the one outlined in section
II can be presented and shown to lead to substantial savings and/or extended production
possibilities, an “x” year tax credit for the income generated through the scheme can be gran-
ted upon certification by an environmental regulatory authority. The tax credit can, in turn, be
used as collateral for the outlays needed in order to facilitate implementation of the agreement
arrived at. This solution implies that the information needed for the decision of the tax authori-
ty is totally forthcoming from the parties involved and, as it needs to be certified by the envi-
ronmental regulatory authority and does not require any additional information gathering on
the part of the tax authority. The tax credit can easily be implemented within the context of
current procedures, and the tax base has been broadened by the volume of the income genera-
ted (I) through re-partitioning of property rights multiplied by (n - x), with “n” being the time
during which taxes can be expected to be levied. 
As we look at Adam Smith’s criteria, we notice that this scheme violates every one aspect of
his principle of certainty. The tax incentive is not the same for each tax payer, as it crucially
depends on the specifics of the re-partitioning scheme negotiated. Although the tax incentive is
not arbitrary, it is certainly not well known in advance. The time at which it becomes effective
depends only on the activities of the taxees, as does the manner of payment, as even does the
quantity to be paid, and none of these is clear and plain in advance. What becomes clear and
plain is the tax credit, as this instrument needs to be used as collateral. The tax credit, in turn,
10
drives the implementation of the scheme. If the authorities err in setting the tax credit too low,
the scheme will not be launched and the additional increase of the tax base will not be forthco-
ming. If they set it too high, they still increase the tax base but forego some tax 
revenue.   
Ironically enough, this environmental tax as a tax credit satisfies the double dividend criterion.
The double dividend even has an institutional realization. The environmental dividend is being
certified by the environmental authority, the fiscal dividend is being certified by the tax authori-
ty granting the tax credit.
IV. A Simple Illustration
At the heart of the proposal made in this paper lies Buchanan's notion of choice influencing
costs and, specifically choice influencing taxes. The proposal is driven by the need to define a
choice influencing tax, since the point of introducing ecological taxes is to influence decision
makers in their ecologically relevant behaviour. For purposes of illustration, we have defined
the stylized situation of a river valley with three partly incompatible uses of the eco-system, i.e.
wine growing, fishing, and power generation. Of course, this is only a stylized model, any
degree of complexity can be introduced without affecting the basic issue, which is to define
property rights so as to make the different uses of the resource compatible. By repartitioning
property rights, the production possibilities of the economy (here in the river valley) are being
broadened, but these benefits are partly offset by the transactions costs that need to be incurred
in order to bring the new definition of property rights about. 
If taxes are to influence choices, it is important to define or identify those decision points
where choices can actually be taken. The difficulty with identifying such decision points is that
a tax administration cannot by itself accomplish this task. Only a general rule broadly descri-
bing the decisions and their consequences will allow the identification of a particular decision
point, a point in time which is subject to decisions by the tax payer. This is in itself not an
anomaly. In the presence of capital gains taxes, for instance, tax payers will take their decision
so as to minimize the liability, they will therefore choose the point of a transaction that leads to
a capital gain with a view to minimizing the tax liability. In the case of ecological taxes, we
want to stimulate neither capital accumulation nor tax avoidance but a positive ecological
decision, which means that an incentive needs to be defined so as to induce parties to change
their behaviour in an ecologically positive way. In our stylized example, the decision requires
co-operation of the three parties involved, with respect to 
a) the choice of technology and process management of power production; 
b) the choice of fish to bread and harvest;
c) in all likelihood also the choice of grapes.
The crucial decision involves the consensual repartitioning of property rights in order to make
a resource use compatible, and on this repartitioning decision rest the three decisions named
above. 
An important issue in this case is technology choice. The stylized example involves two
different types of technology choice. On the one hand, inside the ecological system as defined
in section two, the relevant technology choice refers to the cooling system, which in our
example must be flexible enough so as to provide for either warm water directly emitted into
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, (1786). London: Dent, 19719
See for instance, Joseph Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector, New York: Norton10
11
the river, or water being retained within the cooling system long enough so as to prevent the
formation of mist at crucial moments. However, another technology choice is relevant with
respect to the ecological system itself and interests outside this system. This is the choice of
fuel to be used for the generation of electrical power, such as carbon or nuclear energy. 
V. Issues of Implementation
This section is devoted to showing the substantial difference between a traditional eco-tax and
the environmental tax instrument developed in this paper, which imposes the environmental tax
by (seemingly paradoxically) working with the tax credit. Such a comparison, of course, must
be a mental exercise, since the new instrument is not yet in place, we cannot conceivably have
data on which to base a comparison. Even if we had such data, due to the complexity of how
this instrument works, as it affects the behaviour of the respective agents in the long run
including the choice of technology, it would be difficult to find proper cases to compare: the
number of relevant variables would be large, the time spent over which the comparison would
have to be conducted would necessarily have to be a long one and, by implication, the number
of intervening variables would also have to be considered high. 
On the other hand, such a comparison is necessary in order to gorge the practical feasibility of
the proposal. It would be irresponsible to propose a tax instrument with such deep and far
flung consequences if we could not at least offer a framework in which to analyze the respecti-
ve effects of alternative ecological taxes. Such a framework I am trying to offer in this section
of the paper. 
In developing this framework, I can rely on the traditional theory of taxation, developed
already by Adam Smith and with variations reproduced in every major text book in public9
finance. I am referring to those criteria by which we judge whether tax is “good” in a very
specific sense and should therefore be supported, or whether it fails this test. A tax is, of
course, not a good thing as such. Yet when we accept the reason for its existence, such as the
need to raise revenues for a particular public purpose or, in this case, to conduct environmental
policy, then we can discuss different tax instruments from the point of view of that need in
terms of the criteria that follow. In their modern version, we typically distinguish five such
criteria or principles which constitute the canon of taxation. 10
On the other hand, these five criteria can be applied to the conceivable levels or jurisdictions of
taxation. In principle, we can distinguish between the federal level in a political entity that is
constituted of Member States, a level of the Member States, as well as the original territorial
entities, such as a municipality, counties, cantons and the like. Obviously, if a federal system is
itself part of a federation, the discussion here offered under the first level of the federal govern-
ment needs to be repeated twice, once for the overall federation and once for the Member
State as a federation. In addition to these three levels of government, the federal, the state and
the local level of government, we also have the functional forms of government, which have
See Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, “FOCJ; Creating a Single European11
Market for Governments”, in: Dieter Schmidtchen and Robert Cooter (eds.), Consti-
tutional Law and Economics of the European Union, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
1997, pp. 195-215
Arthur Cecil Pigou, (1947)12
12
become increasingly important in recent times. These functional forms can be defined different-
ly, functionally or territorially for instance in ecological entities such as a water basin (the
Dutch “waterschappen”), a mountain ridge or a sea basin, they can also be without any territo-
rial link, such as when a profession is publicly chartered and has its publicly sanctioned rules
and dues. These dues are taxes in our sense. There may be room for an important increase in
the role of these entities, as Bruno S. Frey has argued in various papers on the importance of
functional overlapping competitive jurisdictions (FOCJ) in a series of papers. This ap roach11
yields a five by four matrix, with the five principles of taxation vertically arranged and the four
levels of government horizontally enumerated. We shall now discuss the four levels of govern-
ment in turn, with the five principles as our guiding criteria. 
The Matrix of Comparison
1 Federal 2 State 3 Local 4 FOCJ
1 Efficiency 1 6 11 16
2 Feasibility 2 7 12 17
3 Flexibility 3 8 13 18
4 Responsibility4 9 14 19
5 Fairness 5 10 15 20
1. From the point of view of economic efficiency, here discussed against the background
of implementing either set of tax policies at a federal level of government, the follo-
wing can be said. At the federal level of government, there will be extreme difficulties
in collecting the correct information that is necessary for a regulatory ecological
charge. This is a problem Pigou already had addressed. Howev r, the system of12
ecological taxation operating with tax credits described in this article may very well
require a supervisory authority at the federal level in order to make sure that the tax
credits are not wasted in that interest groups with local importance do not ride the
roost. In this sense, from an efficiency point of view, the federal level of government
has a very small role to play with the traditional Pigouvian scenario, a meaningful role,
however, with the scenario of choice based ecological taxation. 
2. With respect to the feasibility of implementing either proposal at the federal level, it
needs to be noted that it is obviously easy to implement an excise tax said to have
ecological merits at the highest level of the taxing authority, in this case in the federal
level, since in this case, evasion will be reduced to either external markets or intra-
See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, he Calculus of Consent. A n Arbor:13
University of Michigan Press, 1969. Originally suggested by John Caldwell Calhoun in
his “Speech on the Admission of California - and the General State of the Union”
(March 4, 1850). In John C. Calhoun, Union and Liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
1992, pp. 571-601
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jurisdiction tax evasion. The administrative feasibility here stands in stark contrast
with economic efficiency, since Pigouvian charges cannot achieve the desired goal. As
for choice based ecological taxes, their feasible implementation tends not to be at the
federal level, since the federal level is too far removed from the scenario in which
choices actually have to take place. From the point of view of the bureaucracy at the
federal level, if it were interested in considering this form of tax, the choice based
ecological tax is unattractive, since it renderes only a very small role to the federal
level of the jurisdiction.
3. With the criterion of flexibility we ask the question whether in this case of the federal
level of the jurisdiction, a particular tax regime set in place will automatically and
flexibly react to changing circumstances relevant to the object of taxation so as to
minimize the excess burden of taxation. Here we can first and foremost note that the
Pigouvian regime is totally inflexible with respect to the desired result, as it has no
inbuilt corrector to guide people’s choices under differing circumstances. This is
totally the opposite with the choice based ecological tax instrument, since the tax
credit also serves as a burden sharing instrument with respect to the risk of the ecolo-
gically friendly investment, in harsh time the tax authority assumes a higher burden of
that share, and that is in the interest of tax flexibility. However, the federal level of
government is a poor location for assuming this facilitating role, it should rather better
serve in a re-assurance capacity for lower levels of government. Lower levels of
government can better weigh the economic opportunities faced in a particular region
under certain circumstances, as economic development tends to be drastically diffe-
rent from one region to the other, and hence technological choices work out very
differently from one region to the other. Since the choice based ecological tax appro-
ach imposes a substantial amount of fluctuation in tax revenues on the tax jurisdicti-
ons involved, it may be important, from their point of view, to have some burden
sharing mechanism as a re-insurance system, and here the federal government might
play a useful role. 
4. Issues of political responsibility arise when political processes, such as log roling,13
tend to divert the functional economic purpose of a particular policy measure, for
instance through processes of rent seeking. The question here is whether at the federal
level of government, either one of the tax regimes discussed in this paper would give
rise to such diverting initiatives, and whether at this level of government an effective
response mechanism would be in place. 
As the Pigouvian regime sets fixed rates per output hinged on particular technology
choices, it opens every door for rivals attempts to target particular technologies in
their own interest and at their rivals detriment. Once the per unit of output charges are
See Gustav Schmoller, “The Idea of Justice in Political Economy”, in: A nals of the14
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, IV, 1908, pp. 697-737
See Jürgen Backhaus, “Subsidiarity and Ecologically Based Taxation: An Essay on15
Public Choice From a European Point of View. Public Choice 88, 1996
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in place, they are difficult to remove, and the damage to the rival can be substantial.
On the other hand, the choice based tax instruments, as it is an individualized almost
custom made package for each particular set of decisions makes,  it is very difficult
for rivals to effectively intervene as they can in the Pigouvian scenario. Hence, from
the point of view of preventing rent seeking, the choice based approach is preferable,
yet again the federal level has a very small role to play, only at most a supervisory
one, probably to be excercised by the respective court of audit of that federal jurisdic-
tion.
5. On the issue of fairness with respect to any form of environmental policy, it is difficult
in that for instance in the European Union the preferences of voters with respect to
such issues as personal income growth, employment or environmental improvements
tend to diverge substantially, typically in a north south divide, with the northern
Member States emphasizing ecological issues at the expense of growth, the southern
states expressing the reversed preference. What is fair, of course, is basically an
empirical issue. Tax policies have to be in sync with voters’ preferences, and if they
are not, they are considered unfair. Issues of fairness cannot be deductively determi-
ned, they are largely in empirical issue. From this point of view, the federal level of14
government is ill prepared to ensure fairness in taxation with respect to either form of
ecological taxation here discussed. However, in addition, the choice based form of
ecological taxation requires the knowledge of many local aspects which cannot neces-
sarily be assumed to be fairly represented at the federal level of government. At the
federal level of government, local legislators such as those sitting in the European
Parliament, tend to bundle different concerns together so as to accomplish a maximum
for their particular district, but the end result to the outsider often looks bizarre. From
the point of view of the fairness criterion it seems that the federal level of government
is ill-suited for either form of taxation. 
6. The issue of whether the state level of government can efficiently discharge either of
the two policy scenarioes discussed depends a lot on the constitution of the particular
state with respect to ecological circumstaces. Remarkably, just as of this writing,
Poland has re-constituted itself into a set of reletavily independent provinces from a
centrally inspired system of centrally directed departments, and these provinces to a
certain extent follow geographical and ecological conditions, with Silesia, Pommerani-
a and Allenstein-Ermland being reconstituted. However, many ecological problems
defy the possibilities of states that have to operate within the boundaries that they
have historically inherited. Here, it is often necessary that different states often from
different Member States of a federation join together insolving a particular ecological
problem that they face together, but which is not important enough to really reach the
agenda of their respective federal entity. This can be effected, in the European con-
text, through an agressive application of the subsidiarity principle. If a state does not15
See Roger van den Bergh, Michael Faure and Jürgen Lefevre, “The Subsidiarity
Principle in European Environmental Law: An Economic Analysis”, in: Erling Eide
and Roger van den Bergh (eds.), Law and Economics of the Environment, Oslo:
Juridisk Forlag, 1996, pp. 121-166
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want to go it alone with a specific Pigouvian tax regime, it has only a very small role
to play, as the federal level of government will insist on tax harmonization. However,
with respect to the choice based ecological tax approach, states have much more of a
role to play, in particular with respect to initiating and facilitating such regimes which
have to be implemented at a lower level. 
7. As we look at administrative feasibility, however, it appears that both systems can be
readily implemented by the states, as they tend to have the most effective administrati-
ve bodies. However, the states will also suffer the adverse repercussions of the Pigou-
vain tax scenario, while on the other hand they will be able to reap some of the bene-
fits of the choice based approach. This will be the case, because they will suddenly
share in the tax revenue thus generated. Civil servants in the tax service necessarily
emphasize the fecundity of a particular tax, and therefore devote most of their attenti-
on to those taxes that yield sub-stantial revenue. In this sense, the choice based appro-
ach enjoys a feasibility advantage, as it is more congenial to the ethics of a tax officer
to generate revenues with a minimum of excess burden and conceivably a technologi-
cal tax improvement earned on the side.
8. At the state level, the Pigouvian tax regime cannot be expected to flexibly respond to
changing economic or ecological conditions by itself in terms of a self-enforcing tax
regime. If, for instance, the state levies a tax per kilowatt hour of electricity producti-
on, increased economic activity will simply translate into increased demand and a
substantial shifting of the tax onto the user, in the case of industrial users probably
further even onto the customers, the ecological effect will be small. On the other
hand, the choice based system working with tax credits quickly translates changing
economic decisions into the relevant investment decision calculus: if in the same
example, increased demand prompts a capacity expansion, technology choice will be
directly perfected in the desired direction to achieve the environmental goal. Typical-
ly, the states have jurisdiction of both the tax administration and the environmental
regulatory bodies; for instance in the Federal Republic of Germany each of the sixteen
states has its own ministry of finance and one ministry designated for environmental
affairs. Hence, the too prominent administrative structure required for the implimenta-
tion of the choice based proposal is, indeed, present at the state level. 
9. If the Pigouvian tax regime is introduced at the state level, it will be difficult to reflect
the state electorate’s preferences with respect to environmental issues in the level of
the unit charges. The states compete among each other for the siting of industries,
and, for instance in the case of electricity generation, it is easy to shift production
from one state to the other, as essentially all Europe is interconnected and distance
only imposes costs in terms of losses and transportation. The choice based regime
working with tax credits, however, is better suited to reflect the different voters’
See Gerd Winter, Das Vollzugsdefizit im Wasserrecht. Berlin: Schmidt, 197516
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preferences, since in the implementation of these policies both the environmental
authority and the fiscal authority can vary the standards which they apply in using
their discretion. A state particularly eager to push environmentally compatible produc-
tion technologies can take, through its environmental authority, an active role, even
suggesting particular technologies and supporting feasibility studies, thereby facilita-
ting the grant of the tax credit. 
10. From the point of view of fairness, the state is better positioned to translate voters’
preferences into policies with respect to either tax regime, as in a federation the
notions of fairness with respect to environmental issues tend to be much more diffe-
rent than in a smaller entity. But this is a relative statement only. With respect to the
two different tax regimes, a more specific statement is possible. The typical 
Pigouvian tax regime as per unit charges can be extra-ordinarily regressive, burdening
those with the least elastic demand curve for the product in question. And this group
will necessarily include a large number of those who, by whichever criterion is used,
are considered worse off in that particular society and should therefore benefit from
an application of the fairness principle to the particular policy in 
question. On the other hand, the choice based regime does not have these regressive
effects, and it is therefore not open to this criticism from the point of view of fairness. 
11. At the regional or local level, with respect to efficiently implementing either one of the
two tax regimes, substantial differences appear. The smaller the jurisdiction in questi-
on, the more difficult it becomes to conduct an own policy if the instrument at hand is
the Pigouvian tax regime. Competition among jurisdictions will drive the ecological
charges downwards in terms of some kind of Dela Warization process, making the
instrument difficult to handle at the local level. Also in the implemen-tation literature,
implementation deficits tend to be concentrated at the lower levels of government16
and in the smaller states. For instance, Germany’s substantial implementation deficit
with respect to European Union legislation owes much to the complicated structure of
the federation, since the federal government typically cannot enact the legislation in
question by itself but needs the co-operation of the states, some-times the municipali-
ties as well. Hence, for the Pigouvian tax regime the regional and local governments
can hardly be seen as the appropriate jurisdictions to carry out the policy. This is
different for the choice based regime, since here a possible implementation deficit
would work to the disadvantage of the company that wants to apply the tax credit to
its revenues. Hence, the regime is self-enforcing and the problem just sketched does
not appear. 
12. For reasons similar to those given under 11, the feasibility of the Pigouvian tax regime
at the regional or local level is questionable. Obviously, since the regime is so simple,
it can be easily monitored and it can also be implemented if the admini-strative will is
present. However, since the regime may run counter to the interests at play at the
local or regional level, the aforementioned implementation deficit will arise, and here
lies the feasibility problem. On the other hand, the choice based system is necessarily
deeply anchored in the local community, and hence will be utorly feasible, since all the
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parties involved derive a gain of some sort. The various producers improve their
production possibilities, the tax collecting authority ultimately reaps higher revenue
and in any event broadens its tax base, and the environmental authority, from the very
start of the implementation of the technology, is aware of all the technological details
and hence able to monitor the respective activities actively, therefore being able to
easily discharging its duties. 
13. Changing circumstances can be particularly trying at the local level, and a rigid regime
such as the Pigouvian one can bring about substantial friction loss. It has to be inflexi-
ble since otherwise it would be easily undermined by interest groups, which operate
most effectively at the highest level of government, i.e. the federal level. The choice
based approach, on the other hand, does allow for flexible responses, most of which
are built in the very proposal. The tax credit, for instance, can only be applied against
income actually earned. Hence, whatever delays there may occur in construction or
otherwise in the implementation of the project do not affect the community much, as
the company in question has a maximum incentive to implement the ecologically
friendly project in order to earn the tax credit. For instance, if labour is in abundant
supply in a macro-economic slump, the project will be completed faster, and part of
the abundant labour supply will be absorbed in the project: on the other hand, if there
is a shortage in the labour market, the project may be delayed, but the delay will not
work out cyclically, rather anti-cyclically. The tax credit itself has an equilibrating
function. 
14. At the local level, the communication lines are so short that behaviour by government
agencies that is irresponsive to the sentiment of the population can meet with drastic
disapproval, even outright obstruction. The implementing agency of the Pigouvian tax
regime at the local or regional level is confronted by a substantial problem, hence the
aforementioned implementation deficit. On the other hand, the choice based system
allows for so much information to be filtered into the process before the investment
has actually been made that, unless circumstances change dramatically, the project
should always be highly responsive to different local demands. In the example sket-
ched above, it was shown to be responsive to changes in weather conditions, conditi-
ons of the river, seasonal variations and the like. 
15. At the local level, the most important issue of equity or fairness is the provision of the
basic needs (Daseinsvorsorge), and it is here where the Pigouvian regime substantially
encumbers the companies charged with the provision of local needs, while the choice
based system can allow for a far reaching consideration of local circumstances, it
actually is based on the requirement. to use these data as an input. 
16. Now we are turning to the possibility or organizing jurisdictions in such a way, that
while they are competing, they may actually overlap and be functio allyd fined as
opposed to erritorially. This is highly important from the point of view of the 
environment, since many people engage in activities that are relevant to the environ-
ment who live in different territorially based jurisdictions, while in each one of these
jurisdictions, only very few engage in the relevant activity. If you are a dentist, for
instance, you necessarily have to use some material that can be toxic if inadvertantly
dumped into the environment such as into water. It would make little sense to require
For the details on this scheme, see Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, “FOCJ;17
Creating a Single European Market for Governments”, in: Dieter Schmidtchen and
Robert Cooter (eds.), Constitutional Law and Economics of the European Union,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997, pp. 195-215
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every local jurisdiction to oversee the use of these materials, as for all intents and
purposes only dentists as a group constitute, in this example, the major cause for
concern. Hence, the medieval principle of organizing professions as estates can be
relied upon, in this case creating a jurisdiction over all practicing dentists. The 
regime with respect to their environmentally relevant behaviour would then have to be
administered by this jurisdiction of, say, European dentists, and again we can think of
two variations of our two regimes, on the one hand a per unit charge on the use of the
material in question, on the other hand a system of tax credits depending upon the
choice of technology and certification used in the respective practice. From the point17
of view of economic efficiency, the FOCJ (Functional Overlapping Competing Juris-
dictions) are a direct institutional translation of the standard public goods model.
Hence, their relationships to the concept of economic efficiency is immediate. Howe-
ver, within these FOCJ the two different tax regimes can still be at issue, and it is
immediately clear that the Pigouvian regime may well be decided upon by a majority
of constituants, such as the dentists, depending upon the demand schedule of their
respective customers. Old dentists will be interested in and defending their old techno-
logy and they would prefer the Pigouvian charge, while newly graduated dentists
would be more prown to implementing new technologies, since the technology used it
necessarily tied to the human capital, and increasingly so over time. Hence, from the
point of view of economic efficiency, the choice between the two regimes under
conditions of FOCJ needs to be discussed with the appropriate social discount rate in
mind. Basically, the choice based system will be more innovative and therefore dyna-
mically more efficient than the Pigouvian regime. 
17. The feasibility of implementing FOCJ depends first of all on the constitutional circum-
stances of each Member State. It is not by chance that Swiss authors suggest this
particular proposal, since the basically medieval concept is still somewhat alive in the
Helvetian confederation. However, the wisdom of the concept should not be underes-
timated. The change from functional to territorial organization in the Holy Roman
empire ultimately led to the Thirty Years War, one of the big desasters in Central
European history. Hence, it makes sense to re-think the constitutional pattern of
organization, and to tie this into modern economic theory. Issues of feasibility need to
be discussed for each particular suggestion made. For instance, it is quite possible to
organize, on a European scale, all dentists and then regulate their environmentally
relevant behaviour. Here, we can again look at the two tax regimes, and it will be
obvious that the per unit charge will be more feasible if the customer is a national
health service and simply absorbs the entire tax. The environmental impact will be
next to nihil. On the other hand, if the dentists themselves operate in a competitive
environment, they may be prone to technological innovation, and here the effect
would be very different indeed. Hence, from that point of view, the choice based
appraoch appears to be superior. 
See Benito Arruñada, “In the Economics of Notaries”, Europ an Journal of Law and18
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18. The issue of flexibility needs to be discussed in terms of two different aspects. On the
one hand, since interests are so well defined in terms of functional purposes, the entire
jurisdiction can be pictured as being extremely alert with respect to the issues that
confront this particular group. On the other hand, it may seem utterly inert as a lot of
experience tends to be build into its standard reactions, certainly over time. If the
group is highly functionally organized, it will have intricate ceremonies with end based
reward systems and very little flexibility in its rules, while very wide areas of discreti-
on with respect to the material issues.Hence, what may appear inflexible may indeed18
be highly flexible in providing functional responses. In implementing a Pigouvian
regime, the FOCJ are in much better shape than the territorially based jurisdictions,
because they do have the respective information to set efficient rates. How they solve
the problem of innovation within their own jurisdiction, the problem mentioned under
16, depends very much on their internal structure and on the extent to which they
have to confront competitive challenges. For instance, if in the case of the dentists the
customers are organized, at least in some countries, through national health programs,
technology choice will be seriously affected. This leads us to 
conclude that the feasibility of implementing this program depends very much on
institutional circumstances, time and place. 
19. The issue of political responsibility acquires a totally different dimension in the con-
text of FOCJ, since we can no longer talk about an Athenasian polis with ll its (inde-
pendently wealthy) citizens gathering in the market place, if the members of the FOCJ
can be widely scattered and need not necessarily come into personal contact one with
the other on a regular basis. Here, political responsibility has to be discussed in terms
of group democracy, the ability of the group leadership to avoid 
Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy and to be responsive to the needs of the base. This
will depend much on the voting mechanisms used, and public choice literature provi-
des a wealth of possibilities to solve that particular problem, the demand revealing
process being one of them that comes immediately to mind. Here, the choice of either
one of the mechanisms will be taken with much more information as an input than in
any of the other scenario’s sketched. However, monitoring the choice based process
becomes much simpler in the context of FOCJ, since new information on technologi-
cal possibilities and pitfalls will be constantly available and floating in the networks of
that particular profession or group. Hence, the FOCJ approach does allow for sub-
stantial improvement in enhancing political responsibility of whichever tax regime is to
be chosen. 
20. One of the interesting aspects of the FOCJ approach is that issues of fairness can no
longer be discussed in terms of equity. If you focuss on a particular group which is a
composition of small subsets of different societies, the equity notions that prevail in
any one particular society can no longer be part of the common ideology of that
particular group that you have organized as a FOCJ. This means that fairness will
20
have to be discussed not in terms of material outcomes but in terms of procedural
rules. It does not strike me as obvious that the two regimes differ on this particular
criterium. 
VI. Concluding remarks
The answer to the question noted in the title of this paper then becomes clear and simple. An
effective ecological tax is a tax credit on personal or corporate income taxes upon certifi-
cations of an ecological improvement scheme. The tax credit kicks in when the scheme is being
made effective. The operation of the scheme depends soley on the co-operations of tax payers,
it requires no additional information on the part of necessarily underinformed public authori-
ties. Interestingly, there is a new and peculiar double dividend in the sense that next to an
ecological improvement, there is a new revenue stream for government. 
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